Universal HealthcareBy NextBestFit

Targets and quality metrics invite gaming

Wait-time guarantees, quality bonuses, and spending targets can be gamed: re-labeling referral dates, avoiding sick patients, or upcoding.

Evidence

  • NHS England's waiting-list targets have been associated with documented gaming.

Who's affected

Who is hurt
Who gains while it lasts

Under your mix of paths

Paths that create or worsen it
Paths that fix or soften it
Using your saved plan. 0 paths picked.Edit all picks
Root causes
  • Rewards tied to measurable proxies

Open questions

  • How should metrics be audited and designed to resist gaming?

Caused or worsened by these paths

This problem only matters if one of these paths is chosen.

Fix Medicare Advantage paymentsMedicare Advantage overpayments and coding intensityChosen

Plans adapt to coding reforms, and previous reforms only partly closed the payment gap.

Capitation for primary care and integrated systemsU.S. prices are far higher than in other countriesChosen

Fixed payments per enrollee create an incentive to avoid sick patients rather than provide their costly care.

Stepped care and integration into primary careMental health care is hard to getChosen

Outcome targets in stepped mental health care can be gamed.

Legal wait-time guaranteesLonger waits if demand grows faster than capacityChosen

A care deadline can encourage gaming of referral dates.

Regional administrators under national rulesOne payer becomes one targetChosen

Making regional administrators compete on integrity metrics puts those measures at the center of performance comparisons.

Hold the single payer to service standardsLosing the choice of health plan and insurer competitionChosen

Published call-wait, claim-time, and appeal measures can be gamed rather than reflect service accurately.

Solution paths (2)

Open a path for what it fixes, what it creates or worsens, who gains and who loses, precedents, and how it connects to other paths. See all paths as a decision tree.

Keep a short list of hard-to-game measures (outcomes, patient-reported) and audit them.

  • +Targets and quality metrics invite gaming
  • −Leaves less complete or useful data
  • −Adds paperwork, coordination, or complexity

Publish data for transparency but don't attach bonuses, removing the incentive to game.

  • +Targets and quality metrics invite gaming
  • +About $1 trillion a year in administrative cost
  • −Weakens incentives for desired behavior
  • −Leaves less complete or useful data